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I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental law in the 1990s has taken new directions. 
On the international front, global warming, acid rain, biodivers-
ity, sustainability, and the 1992 Earth Summit are a few of the 
more pressing concerns. Domestically, between President 
Bush's "environmental administration" and Vice President 
Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, Environmental Protection 
• Dean and Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The 
paper is based on a speech delivered at the Twenty-First Annual Conference on the 
Environment hosted by the ABA Standing Committee on Environmental Law at 
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 15-17, 1992. I thank my colleague John Applegate for his 
careful reading of, and his helpful comments on, this article. 
1 
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Agency (EPA) Administrator William K. Reilly had his hands 
full. Indeed, two currents of environmental law cannot be 
denied: (1) environmental law is inextricably tied into interna-
tional arenas, l and (2) environmental law is focusing more on 
the efficiency aspects of environmental regulation than ever 
before. 2 
The efficiency move may mean that environmental law and 
regulation are finally catching up to Chicago-style laissez-faire 
thinking, or it may be the last remnant of the Reagan Revolu-
tion. In either case, the contemporary, committed environ-
mentalist must consider the consequences of environmental 
regulation on economic development. The move to international 
conventions, transboundary problems, and global solutions is 
simply a recognition of the reality of the transnational interde-
pendencies between natural resources, energy, the environment, 
and the world economy. These changes in orientation from 
stewardship to cost-risk-benefit analysis and from the domestic 
to the international scene are deeply significant and cannot be 
ignored. 
Still, there is yet another dramatic phenomenon in environ-
mental law in the 1990s that may well signal the emergence of a 
unique way of thinking about environmental law and policy. 
Until recently, the only substantial environmental equity issue 
was generally viewed in the context of transgenerational justice.3 
1. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 
(1992); LESTER BROWN ET AL., THE STATE OF THE WORLD (1984-92) (describing the 
global environment with strategic recommendations); LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1990) (examining global 
environmental movement and international environmental cooperation); ORGANIZATION 
FOR EcONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEV., THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1991) 
(recognizing worldwide economical and ecological interdependence and the need for global 
environmental improvement); UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., 
OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (attempting to formulate a global agenda for environmental 
change in order to achieve worldwide sustainable growth). 
2. The literature on tradeable emission permits is perhaps the clearest example of 
market-based environmental laws. See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 345-77 (3d ed. 1991); Robert W. Hahn 
& Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons/or Theory and Practice, 16 EcOLOGY 
L.Q. 361, 368-96 (1989); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based 
Environmental Regulation, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). In addition, the political rhetoric 
of the Bush Administration emphasized the linkages between environmental protection, 
energy efficiency, and economic development. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL 
ENERGY STRATEGY: POWERFUL IDEAS FOR AMERICA 2-3 (1st ed. 1991-92). 
3. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1-3, 
17-46 (1989). 
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Today, environmental equity also includes an analysis of the 
adverse effects of environmental regulation, or the lack thereof, 
on disempowered citizens.4 Although this paper will examine 
domestic issues, international organizations are also wary of 
human rights abuses in environmental regulation. 5 
If you asked someone at least a decade ago if any area of the 
law is free of bias, I would imagine that environmental law 
would have been a likely candidate. After all, efforts to remove 
pollution from land, air, and water could only inure to the bene-
fit of the collective citizenry. Clean air and water, as any econo-
mist will tell you, are the quintessential public goods. Indeed, 
some environmental laws could even be seen as pro-poor. For 
example, low income individuals could benefit disproportion-
ately from the strict enforcement of clean air laws, but this 
potential pro-poor disposition is largely theoretical.6 
Upon further review, a contemporary policy analyst accus-
tomed to the ways of the micro economic model might admit 
that the effects of certain types of environmental regulation, (the 
placement of hazardous waste facilities, for example) might dis-
proportionately impact the poor because it is economically pru-
dent to locate facilities where land is the cheapest. The harsh 
reality of this strategy is that poor people are more likely to live 
in poorer sections of the country; thus, the likelihood of being 
closer to such a facility is higher than that of the general popu-
lace. Thus, under this hypothesis, environmental equity is class-
based and dictated by economic considerations. Racial implica-
tions would, therefore, depend on a correlation between race and 
poverty.7 
If this were a true picture of the world, there would be 
cause enough for concern. To remedy this situation, regulation 
could, for example, require that the cost of placing such facilities 
encompass the cost to the surrounding communities. Such regu-
4. See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. & Dennis Rivera, Pollution's Chie/Victims: The 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at A15. 
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
DEFENDING THE EARTH: ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT iii-vii 
(1992). 
6. See Joseph P. Tomain, Distributional Consequences 0/ Environmental Regulation: 
Economics, Politics, and Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 101, 106-
08 (1991). 
7. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, 
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL 
POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992) (arguing moral obligation to 
distribute goods and services more equally in America). 
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lation would be justified on efficiency grounds by requiring facil-
ity owners to account for externalities and incorporate social 
costs into the price of their services. Furthermore, such regula-
tion would be equitable, as environmental harms and benefits 
could be distributed free of class bias. 
Unfortunately, this picture of class inequity is only partial. 
Environmental inequity also entails racial discrimination. 
Recent studies reveal that, even when an analyst accounts for 
class bias, environmental programs have had a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on racial minorities.8 This race bias cannot 
be discounted and the scholars who have revealed its existence 
have significantly changed the way we must think about environ-
mental regulation in particular and social regulation in general. 
This paper attempts to answer the following question: Why 
does environmental regulation show class and race bias? In 
answering that question, this paper argues that both structural 
and systemic problems pervade environmental decisionmaking 
and contribute to disadvantaging the dis empowered. 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
The environmental equity problems of class bias and racial 
bias have a common structure and a common source. Perhaps it 
is not too much to hope that they may also share a common 
solution. The common structure results from the inability of dif-
fuse and relatively powerless groups to participate in environ-
mental decisionmaking and policymaking processes. The 
common source of these problems is the failure of the political 
economy to overcome the barriers to participation. The pro-
8. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 38-43 (1990); CoMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE OF THE 
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 13-22 
(1987); 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING 
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA]; U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SmNG OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR 
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNmES 
1-5 (June 1983); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, THE TRUTH ABoUT WHERE You LIVE: AN 
ATLAS FOR ACTION ON TOXINS AND MORTALITY ch. 6 (1991); Regina Austin & Michael 
Schill, Black, Brown, Poor, & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the 
QuestJor Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69,69-71 (1991); Kelly M. Colquette & 
Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and 
Commendations, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 158-62 (1991); R. George Wright, Hazardous 
Waste Disposal and the Problems oj Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 
791-99 (1991); Roger D. Colton, A Case Study in Environmental and Poverty Conflict: 
Auto Replacements as a Clean Air Strategy (Apr. 25, 1992) (on file with author). 
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posed common solution is to restructure the political process to 
allow more meaningful participation-to allow more voice9 in 
the environmental regulatory process. This inclusion can occur 
at the agency level (through appointments)10 or through grass 
roots activism.11 This paper suggests wider participation in 
rulemaking and decisionmaking processes. 
There is a direct connection between the common structure 
and the common source of environmental equity problems, and 
they can be usefully discussed together. Moreover, former EPA 
General Counsel E. Donald Elliott succinctly made this point: 
Standard economic and public choice theory would predict 
that groups that are less powerful politically and economically 
would be more likely to be exposed to disamenities of all types. 
In any event, in this instance, those who are least able to defend 
themselves through the political and economic system are more 
likely to bear the brunt of the harms of pollution. 12 
By elaborating on Professor Elliott's quotation, I intend to 
show that the disempowerment of certain groups and the resul-
tant environmental inequities are the consequences of four fail-
ures of the political economy: (1) economic, (2) political, (3) 
constitutional, and (4) legal. The thesis is that before the voice 
of certain groups (i.e. racial minorities and the poor) can be 
heard by environmental policymakers, government regulation 
must be responsive to those failures. 
I can state my thesis in one word: politics. Environmental 
equity is fundamentally an issue of regulatory politics. Simply 
stated, environmental equity is about distributive justice and, in 
particular, the distribution of environmental harms and benefits. 
As a preface to the discussion of the "four failures," we 
must recognize both the polycentric structure13 of environmental 
9. See ALBERT o. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, LoYALTY: REsPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 120-26 (1970). 
10. See 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECfION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: 
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNmES 69-71 (June, 1992). 
11. Luke W. Cole, Correspondence: Remedies for Environmental Racism: a View 
from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991, 1996-97 (1992); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, 
Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 426-27 (1991). 
12. E. Donald Elliott, Jr., A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional 
Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 7 
(1991). 
13. See. e.g., Milton R. Wessel, SCIENCE AND CONSC1ENCE 4-10 (1980); Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 395 (1978). See 
generally ROBERT F. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 187-219 (1982) 
(discussing the ethics of nuclear power). 
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disputes and the dynamic flow of environmental laws over the 
past two decades from stewardship to sustainability and from a 
problem-specific focus to global monitoring; from this we can 
readily see that environmental law is not a static concept. 14 The 
structure and the dynamics of environmental law provide two 
lessons. First, environmental disputes are complex and costly 
due to such complexity. Groups with limited or no resources 
cannot compete effectively in the process. Second, one must 
realize that to discuss environmental regulation and distributive 
justice in one breath is to paint too grand a picture. Rather, 
environmental problems must be disaggregated and discussed 
with specificity to recognize that the distributional issues cut 
many ways. 
We must not assume that all minority communities, 
whether referring to the urban poor or the Native Americans of 
this country or the indigenous peoples of developing countries, 
share the majority view of environmentalism. Conventional wis-
dom suggests that environmental protection is acceptable as long 
as it does not detract from economic productivity. A cruel vari-
ant of this theme is that it is easier (and cheaper) to provide for 
environmental protection if there is less invested in economic 
production (i.e. let deyeloped areas or countries produce and let 
developing and undeveloped areas or countries protect). The 
direct domestic consequence of this conventional wisdom is that 
the poor sections of urban and rural economies suffer the effects 
of pollution in the name of economic production, while the 
wealthy sections provide environmental protection under the 
guise of green spaces. The dominant view is too crude. Benefits 
and harms are distributed unevenly among rich and poor, devel-
oped and developing countries, different generations, and 
according to particular environmental problems. 
Both the polycentric structure of environmental problems 
and the dynamic status of environmental law contribute to the 
disadvantages suffered by disenfranchised groups; they also sug-
gest a particular regulatory response. The problem may best be 
addressed by a political process solution (rather than through a 
substantive command and control standard) or a directive to 
decisionmakers to consider equity issues in their cost (risk)-bene-
fit analyses. 
14. See Mark Sagoff, The Great Environmental Awakening, 9 AMERICAN PROSPEcr, 
39, 42-44 (1992). 
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III. THE FOUR F AlLURES 
Relative to the benefits and burdens of environmental regu-
lation, the political economy has disadvantaged these groups in 
four more or less specific, yet complementary, ways. At the bot-
tom, the failures are those of four social institutions: the legisla-
ture, the market, the court, and the agency. Parenthetically, 
one could easily substitute the executive for the agency, thus 
covering all three constitutional branches. 
Obviously, it is rather audacious to suggest in a short paper 
that, not only our market economy, but our entire governmental 
system is deficient in matters of distributive justice. I agree. 
Such a statement is audacious, but also true. Small, focused 
interest groups can outmaneuver larger, diffuse groups in both 
economic and political markets, and the law reinforces this 
disequilibrium. 
A. Failure One-Political Failure 
The current dominant view of the legislative process is that 
legislation is the outcome of a political bargaining process in 
which "deals" are struck by competing interest groups. IS Thus, 
if small, focused, well-financed groups can out-lobby large, dif-
fuse groups, then legislative deals will, of course, favor the more 
organized special interest groups. The favored, special interest 
groups thus, "get a seat at the table" because they are largely 
responsible for setting that very table. 16 
Failure in the political marketplace derives directly from 
interest group theory. Because interest groups will form when 
the benefits to be gained by the members are greater than the 
transaction costs of organizing, smaller interest groups are more 
likely to coalesce. Larger groups are harder to organize and 
more susceptible to numerous "free rider" problems. I? In addi-
tion, broad groups tend to be concerned about nonmonetary 
harms, such as low-level toxic risk. 18 For example, there are 
market disincentives for a large unorganized group (such as "the 
15. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 37-56 
(1988). 
16. See id. at 61-93 (for a critique of interest group theory). 
17. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1965). 
18. See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, In/ormation, and Regulatory 
Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992). 
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poor") to organize in opposition to the placement of a hazardous 
waste facility.19 
In the political marketplace, small, well-financed interest 
groups out-lobby diffuse groups with notable regularity. Con-
sider the politics of your own workplace. Small vocal groups, 
particularly if they register their interest with a focused inten-
sity, will set policy over less intense or less vocal larger groups. 
The obvious defect in this design of majoritarian politics (a 
defect well known to Madison, by the way),2° is that diffuse 
interest groups or factions will go underrepresented or unrepre-
sented. The direct consequence of successful lobbying is the 
effectuation of wealth transfers from one group to another, as 
groups lobby to either capture benefits or to avoid burdens 
through the placement of legal entitlements. 
A partial democratic response to this form of political fail-
ure in the legislature is the notion that government agencies 
"guard" the public interest. Administrative agencies, the dele-
gated authorities of the democratic will of the legislature, are, in 
theory, formed to protect the public interest. This response is 
not wholly satisfactory for two reasons. First, the legislative 
deal may either be silent about or even negatively affect an 
already disadvantaged interest group. If so, then the agency is 
legislatively directed by the legislation to work against the inter-
ests of the disadvantaged group. Second, if a disempowered 
interest group has been "cut out of the deal," then agency offi-
cials cannot assess either a critique or a proposal made by parties 
with no seat at the table. 
B. Failure Two-Economic Failure 
As previously noted, in addition to distributing regulatory 
benefits and burdens, legislation has the direct consequence of 
placing legal entitlements on favored interest groups. The initial 
placement of legal entitlements legislatively empowers interest 
groups and dramatically affects "the players" in the "regulatory 
or judicial games" that remain to be played in the political pro-
cess. To better understand how the initial placement of legal 
entitlements affects the winners and the losers in the legislative 
game, we must discuss economic failure. 
Environmental economics derives more from the subdis-
19. Colquette & Robertson, supra note 8, at 162-70. 
20. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
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cipline of welfare economics than from the classical or neoclassi-
cal economic variants.21 Still, at least in the case of air emissions 
trading, we tum our attention to the micro economic model for 
some environmental regulation. Thus, it is fair to say that both 
neoclassical and welfare economics drive environmental 
regulation. 
Both models have their virtues. When the conditions of the 
neoclassical model are satisfied (i.e. when the market has a large 
number of buyers and sellers, product homogeneity, and "per-
fect" information), then the market obtains its considerable vir-
tues.22 The well-functioning neoclassical market reaches an 
equilibrium at which the proper quantity of goods are produced 
at the proper prices, producer profit and consumer welfare are 
maximized, wealth is created, technological innovation is 
encouraged, and, as an added political attraction, individual lib-
erty and equality are furthered (because each dollar counts as 
one vote, as choice is also maximized).23 In other words, more is 
better because the pie is bigger. 
Given these virtues, it would then seem that "the market," 
rather than government regulation, should produce the "proper" 
amount of pollution or non-pollution at the proper prices. 
Welfare economics, in distinction, has a different focus. It 
assumes that initial starting points are unequal (as the playing 
field is not level for all buyers and sellers), that there are effects 
beyond the boundaries of the self-contained market, and that 
government affects markets. Indeed, a central tenet of welfare 
economics is that, in addition to establishing market prices, mar-
ket transactions produce social costS.24 Consequently, efforts to 
enhance efficiency may be furthered at the cost of distributional 
imbalances and some entity (i.e. the government) must make dis-
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 7-13 (2d ed. 1988); HANDBOOK OF NATURAL REsOURCE AND 
ENERGY EcONOMICS 3-59 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985); JOHN V. 
KRUTILLA & ANTHONY C. FISHER, THE EcONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 3-16 
(2d ed. 1985); JOHN PEET, ENERGY AND THE EcOLOGICAL ECONOMICS OF 
SUSTAINABILITY (1992). 
22. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & JAMES E. HICKEY, JR., ENERGY LAW & POLICY 24-26 
(1989). 
23. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW & 
POLICY, ch. 5 (1993). 
24. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, EcONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 536 (2d ed. 1982). 
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tributional decisions.25 Accordingly, if the "free" market causes 
inequitable distributional consequences, then government inter-
vention into that market is justified, and welfare economics pro-
vides an analytic model for evaluating the market and for 
suggesting regulatory responses. 
The seminal discussion of the efficiency and distributional 
consequences of the placement of legal entitlements derives from 
the work of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase. (Coase authored the 
essential article of the law and economics movement in 1960.)26 
A simple formulation of the Coase Theorem states: "If there are 
zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless 
of the choice of legal rule."27 Simply stated, the initial place-
ment of a legal entitlement .is irrelevant for efficiency purposes. 
In other words, law does not matter. Rather, bargainers will 
contract around problems in their best economic self-interest. 
This theorem can be easily demonstrated numerically.28 
If, for example, legislation permits the location of a hazard-
ous waste facility upon the satisfaction of certain environmental 
conditions, then we can say that, upon the satisfaction of these 
conditions, the project sponsor has a legal entitlement to place 
that facility. Following the Coase Theorem, if the location of 
the facility is unacceptable (Le. too costly) to the neighbors, then 
the neighbors will buyout the project sponsor and the facility 
will be relocated. 
This application of the Coase Theorem is unrealistic in two 
respects. First, it neglects the existence of the political failure 
just discussed. Instead, the Coase Theorem starts with the 
assumption that the initial placement of the legal entitlement is 
neutral. It is this exact proposition that is disproved by interest 
group theory. Interest groups would neither form nor negotiate 
for legislative "deals" if there are no benefits to be had. Second, 
the distribution of resources is not and has never been even. Nor 
has there ever been an "original position"29 from which an 
acceptable allocation of benefits and burdens has flowed. 
Still, the Coase Theorem is powerful and useful. For me, 
25. See, e.g., Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 889, 890-93 (J. Eatwell et al. ed8., 1987). 
26. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). 
27. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 12 
(1983). 
28. TOMAIN & HICKEY, supra note 22, at 40-48. 
29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971), 
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the beauty of the theorem lies in the corollaries and not in the 
theorem itself. There are two primary corollaries. First, given 
transaction costs, the initial placement of a legal entitlement 
may affect the efficiency of a transaction. If the transaction costs 
are high or unequal between the parties, then the wrong place-
ment of the legal entitlement may preclude the attainment of 
efficient bargains. Also, efficient bargains may not be reached if 
one or both parties engage in opportunistic or strategic 
bargaining. 
Second, the initial placement of entitlements affects the dis-
tribution of wealth. Simply stated, law matters-especially with 
regard to distributive justice. Regarding the location of a haz-
ardous waste facility, it matters whether the project sponsor has 
a legal entitlement to locate the facility or whether the neighbors 
have a legal entitlement to force a relocation. Transfer payments 
will go to the party with the legal entitlement, thus effectuating a 
redistribution of wealth. 
These economic ideas are central to a discussion of distribu-
tive justice precisely because of the now familiar reasons that the 
marketplace does not internalize all of its social costs, market-
place transactions spill over into society and cause harm, and the 
distributions of costs and benefits are uneven. 
Thus far, we have seen that poorly organized or unorgan-
ized groups are placed at a double disadvantage. First, they are 
likely to lose the legislative game, thus suffering a political fail-
ure. Second, they suffer economic failure because access to 
wealth empowers groups to play in the legislative arena and 
secure legal entitlements. 
Unfortunately, these political and economic failures are fur-
ther compounded by law, as the have-nots are disadvantaged by 
constitutional and legal failures. 
C Failure Three-Constitutional Failure 
Exascerbating the political and economic imbalance is an 
asymmetrical distribution of constitutional rights. In the regula-
tory arena, the key actors are the regulator and the regulatee. 
As the affected party, the regulatee usually has statutory stand-
ing before the agency. Moreover, should the regulator impinge 
on either the liberty or property interests of the regulatee, then, 
in addition to statutory claims, the regulatee can assert Fifth 
Amendment takings and due process arguments, as well as 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 12 1992-1993
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Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection 
claims.30 In the area of environmental law, one scholar has writ-
ten that some environmental statutory rights take on constitu-
tional weightY 
Affected third parties do not have such extensive constitu-
tional protections. First, third parties are not assured of statu-
tory standing. Third party standing, based on a constitutional 
procedural due process claim, is weak or non-existent. Second, 
once legislation is passed, regulation is proposed or imple-
mented, and benefits or burdens are distributed, affected disen-
franchised third parties may make a general claim that equal 
protection has been violated or that the regulation is unreasona-
ble. To claim an equal protection violation, however, requires 
that the claimants demonstrate not only discrimination in fact, 
but discriminatory intent must also actually be shown before 
relief is available.32 To compound that problem, the range of 
judicial scrutiny of environmental equal protection claims has 
been restrictive. 33 
On the substantive due process side, so long as regulation 
satisfies a "basic rationality" test, then the persons adversely 
affected by the regulation have little chance for relief.34 Once 
again, the organizing problems for diffuse interests in the legisla-
tive arena are legitimized by a narrow scope of equal protection 
review and an expansive scope of substantive due process defer-
ence. Furthermore, access to agencies expands and contracts 
with the law of standing and the current Supreme Court seems 
to be undergoing a contraction.3s 
30. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 23 (at ch. 3). 
31. AMAN, supra note 1, at 29. 
32. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987); Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239-45 (1976). 
33. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (B.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb 
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. 
Supp. 880, 884-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajf'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. 
Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979), ajf'd, 782 
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
34. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (B.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb 
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. 
Supp. 880, 884-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajf'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. 
Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979), ajf'd, 782 
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753-58 (1982) 
(rational basis test under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) (rational basis test). 
35. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: 
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D. Failure Four--Legal Failure 
1. Common Law Failure 
A refinement of the Coase Theorem arrived in a ground-
breaking article by Calabresi and Melamed,36 in which the 
authors suggest that further analysis shows the importance of 
whether a liability rule or a property rule is used and where a 
legal entitlement is placed since the available remedies will affect 
the distributional and efficiency consequences of that placement. 
The use of a property rule can stop a project with an injunction, 
and the use of a liability rule can afford compensation. Thus, 
depending on which party is assigned the legal entitlement, both 
liability and property rules affect the distribution of wealth and 
can also affect efficiency. If the surrounding populace can stop 
the location of a waste facility through an injunction or demand 
compensation through a damages award, then, if the facility 
owner wants to operate the plant, there will be a payment of 
some amount to such individuals. The amount of the payment 
(or the gains from trade) will depend on whether property or 
liability rules are applied. 
The essential problem with liability and property rules is 
that they derive from a common-law, private property base-
line37 and do not easily or adequately account for social costs or 
future effects. Property and liability rules are more easily 
applied to discrete, past disputes involving relatively few par-
ties.38 Nuisance suits, for example, involve difficult evidentiary 
and burden of proof issues, require technical expertise, and fre-
The Tug 0/ War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 677-78 (1992) ("Courts 
tend to grant standing to those groups that were excluded from the original deal .... ") 
with Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632-35 (1992); Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook City, 493 U.S. 20, 25-33 (1989); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). (The Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations of citizen 
suit provisions in environmental statutes). 
36. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View o/the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1089-93 (1972). 
37. See RICHARD EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN vii-x (1985); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 13-18,210-20 (1990). 
38. Class actions, institutional or structural lawsuits, and impact litigation are, of 
course, counter examples. See, e.g., PAUL MAcAvoy, INDUSTRY REGULATION AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 5 (1992) ("While not perfect, the legal 
framework works so much better in the 1990s than when regulation was initiated in the 
1890s or 1930s that it has become a much more attractive alternative to regulatory controls 
and practices."). Still, common law principles, as distinct from government regulation, are 
better applied retrospectively than prospectively. 
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quently yield limited outcomes. In other words, in an area as 
complex as the environment, regulatory controls offer a more 
comprehensive regulatory regime than judicial supervision. 
Moreover, even with the availability of class actions and the 
promise of large contingency fees, the disempowered lack the 
resources to initiate legal action and few attorneys accept such 
cases.39 
2. Agency Failure 
To the extent that the legislative process imperfectly repre-
sents the interests of some groups over others, those imperfec-
tions reappear in administrative agencies. Without adequate 
public participation, agencies are poor guardians of the public 
interest for two reasons. First, since agencies are delegatees of 
congressional action, they simply reproduce the deals cut 
through the legislative process. Second, agencies are subject to 
capture by the regulatee.40 The interest groups that can plausi-
bly capture the EPA, such as Waste Management, Browning-
Ferris, the Sierra Club, or the Nature Conservancy, are not 
inherently responsive to the environmental needs of minorities 
or the poor. 
Thus, given these four reasons-economic failure, political 
failure, constitutional failure, and legal failure-we must ask: Is 
government regulation justified? If so, what sort of regulation is 
responsive?41 
IV. A REGULATORY REsPONSE 
Regulatory analysis posits that the market is preferable to 
government regulation. However, if the market is either ineffi-
cient or unfair, then government regulation may cure the defect. 
Moreover, the identification of the specific market defect also 
suggests the proper regulatory response.42 The political and eco-
nomic failures of environmental regulation demonstrate that not 
39. See Cole, supra note 11, at 1992 & n.3. 
40. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-60 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Theories . 
of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). See generally George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) 
(explaining influence of regulatees in creating regulations). 
41. See generally Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal Rights and 
Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 101 (1991) (analyzing 
remedies for toxic waste dump problems from the local to the international level). 
42. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 23 (manuscript at ch. 1). 
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only are disempowered groups disadvantaged in the legislative 
process, but also that that disadvantage is reproduced in the reg-
ulatory process and is compounded by law. Moreover, each of 
these reciprocal failures have the consequence of diminishing or 
silencing the participatory voice of those least able to help them-
selves. In other words, these four failures of the political econ-
omy all dictate a political process solution. 
In February 1992, the EPA Environmental Equity Work-
group published a draft list of findings and recommendations, 
most of which focus on the collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion of better information and data about the distributional con-
sequences of environmental regulation.43 Calls for more study 
and information are properly cautious and may both confirm 
and reveal other instances of environmental racism. Further-
more, the accumulation of more scientific information and 
knowledge can help institutionalize a regulatory response to 
problems of environmental equity. Indeed, basing a response on 
scientific knowledge establishes a common language for 
reform.44 
Still, I am skeptical that a "techno-rational" response to 
matters of distributive justice is sufficient.4s If the data reason-
ably leads to the conclusion that environmental laws generally 
or that the location of hazardous waste facilities in particular 
disproportionately affect minorities, then more data collection is 
not responsive. The problem is, essentially, political, not techni-
cal; thus, a political solution is necessary. 
If the call for more data collection and analysis is helpful, 
though not responsive, to the four failures, then what is? The 
short answer is wider public participation.46 Somehow, a seat at 
43. EPA, supra note 8, at 6. The recommendations are that the EPA should do the 
following: (1) Increase the priority of environmental equity, (2) collect data and 
information to assess risk by income and race, (3) incorporate environmental equity into 
risk assessment, (4) identify and target opportunities to reduce high concentrations of risk 
to different population groups, (5) assess and consider the distribution of projected risk 
reduction in major rulemakings, (6) review permitting, granting, monitoring, and 
enforcement processes for their impact on environmental equity, (7) improve 
communication with racial minorities and the poor, and (8) incorporate environmental 
equity into long-term planning. Id. 
44. See AMAN, supra note 1, at 138-42. 
45. See also Robert D. Bullard, Comments on the Draft EPA Environmental Equity 
Report (on file with author) (discussing EPA's failure to address "institutionalized racial 
discrimination"). 
46. See Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up 
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster? 19 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 272-82 (1991). 
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the regulatory table must be given to those currently absent. 
There are two basic governmental responses to this situa-
tion. First, the government can establish an agency to serve as a 
surrogate advocate for the disempowered.47 Such an agency can 
provide technical, scientific, and legal resources so that the poor 
and racial minorities can exercise their voice in environmental 
decisionmaking and policymaking processes through proxies or 
through selected attorneys. Second, these processes can be 
opened up to the disadvantaged for their active, direct participa-
tion (beyond ordinary notice and comment participation). One 
way to accomplish this is through an agency's use of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, although ADR is not 
without problems and failures of its own. 
The increased use of ADR by the EPA is a particularly 
appropriate solution to the insufficient political participation 
problem for three timely reasons. First, third party standing 
before administrative agencies is fundamentally statutory (not 
constitutional) and passing legislation is both costly and risky. 
Second, as previously mentioned, the Court's recent glosses on 
statutory standing have been restrictive. Third, and most impor-
tantly, recent legislation authorizes administrative agencies to 
effectively expand participation in ADR programs on their own 
without the need for statutory permission. 
ADR, in general, refers to methods of dispute resolution 
and conflict management other than litigation. In November, 
1990, the Administrative Procedure Act was amended by the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Acr8 and the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1990.49 Although ADR techniques have 
been widely used inside and outside administrative agencies, 
these new federal laws eliminate ambiguity concerning the 
authority of agencies to utilize such methods. 
A. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
The ADR Act is the more generic of the two statutes, 
directing agencies to adopt a policy concerning the use of ADR 
in adjudications, rulemakings, enforcement actions, licensing 
47. See, e.g., Department of Public Advocate Act of 1974, Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27E-1 to 
52:27E-47 (West 1986 & West Supp. 1992). 
48. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-93) 
(Supp. III 1991). 
49. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-90) 
(Supp. III 1991). 
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procedures, and other agency actions. Agencies are further 
directed to appoint and train ADR specialists in the theory and 
practice of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and related tech-
niques. In addition to these techniques, agencies are authorized 
to use conciliation, facilitation, fact-finding, mini-trials, or any 
combination of ADR methods. The purpose behind ADR is to 
avoid costly, polarizing, and time-consuming litigation in favor 
of more efficient, participatory, and creative dispute resolution 
procedures. Through ADR, the parties to a dispute playa more 
active role in facilitating its resolution in lieu of the winner-take-
all aspect of the adversary system. 
B. Negotiated Rulemaking Act 
Much agency activity is accomplished through legislation-
like rulemaking proceedings. Formal and informal rulemaking 
has adversarial characteristics which can lead to expensive and 
time-consuming litigation and appeals. Because rulemaking is 
forward-looking and polycentric (that is, rulemaking often 
involves several parties with various interests), structured nego-
tiation is a method that can reduce the time and expense of a 
rulemaking proceeding. Through negotiated rulemaking (or 
"reg-neg"), so the affected parties can participate in the develop-
ment of the rule, share information and technical knowledge, 
and increase the acceptability of the outcome. 
The central feature of reg-neg is "to bring together repre-
sentatives of the agency and the various interest groups to nego-
tiate the text of a proposed rule."s1 The initial attraction of reg-
neg is that the parties most likely to be affected by an agency's 
rule help draft the rule. As the parties will have an earlier and 
better idea of how they will be affected by the rule, increased 
compliance should result. 
The agency, however, must be careful to bring the right 
"interested parties" to the table. While industry representatives 
may have the wherewithal to participate in reg-neg, individual 
consumers, small groups, and grass roots public interest groups 
may not have sufficient resources to participate effectively. In 
50. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure of Malaise, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 28-31 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: 
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 
GEO. L.J. 1625, 1630-46 (1986). 
51. ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING 
SOURCE BOOK 1 (1990). 
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such a case, an agency must provide resources to make partici-
pation meaningful. 
Thus, while ADR generally and reg-neg particularly, offer 
promises of more creative solutions and more democratic partic-
ipation, they also warrant caution on two fronts. First, ADR 
may magnify the disparity in resources among various interest 
groups unless provisions are made for information (especially 
technical information) to be available to the participants. Sec-
ond, reg-neg may well expand the policymaking role of adminis-
trative agencies, raising the specter of the nondelegation 
doctrine, as the affected parties help write the rules to govern 
themselves. S2 
C. Evaluating ADR 
The ADRS3 movement has much to commend it. ADR 
methods are flexible and applicable to a range of matters. In the 
regulatory arena, ADR is being used on many fronts (especially 
environmental regulation). ADR can be responsive to the four 
failures, especially if outreach is active and technical support is 
made available. Although ADR cannot remake the legislative 
"deal," it can enable the agency to more adequately fulfill its 
charge to regulate in the public interest. With outreach and 
resources, participation can be meaningful, can overcome eco-
nomic and regulatory failure, and can overcome legal failure at 
the agency level. 
Extrajudicial forms of dispute resolution promise to be 
cheaper, quicker, more participatory, and more creative than lit-
igation. Moreover, if the outcomes are, indeed, crafted by the 
disputants, then a high compliance rate for ADR settlements 
may follow. Determining whether these promises are fulfilled 
requires an ADR evaluation. 
Efficiency, effectiveness, and efficacy are the standards used 
to define quality in ADR. Efficiency is equated with cost sav-
ings, while effectiveness denotes user satisfaction and compli-
ance. Although there is little consensus regarding the efficiency 
of mediation, there is general agreement regarding its effective-
ness, where "effective" is defined as achieving settlement in a 
52. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-41 (1935), 
the Supreme Court was critical of the National Industrial Recovery Act for delegating too 
much authority to the President and, in turn, to the industry. 
53. See Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Model of Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 1, 1-18 (1989). 
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high percentage of cases without compromising the quality of 
justice. Additionally, researchers report high levels of user satis-
faction and compliance, with agreements ranging from sixty to 
ninety percent. Efficacy, as a measure of justice, is a more elu-
sive concept, although ADR advocates conclude that such 
mechanisms promote justice because they are more creative, par-
ticipatory, and lead to democratic solutions. 
Critics of alternative processes counter that ADR adds 
another procedural layer (and associated costs) to dispute reso-
lution, arguing that mediation merely creates an illusion of par-
ticipation, voluntariness, and consensus. The central criticism 
surrounds the privatism of mediation and the consequent reduc-
tion in publicity of that process. In other words, private parties, 
under a promise of confidentiality, control the mediation process 
and often the results to the exclusion of public involvement or 
review. Thus, government sanctioned ADR to these critics is 
simply another way of legitimizing private wealth transfers. S4 
The ADR movement, however, particularly as evidenced 
by reg-neg, offers a promising dispute resolution technology for 
broadening participation in agency decisionmaking and poli-
cymaking. With such a promise, though, comes the associated 
risk that ADR can reduce the public oversight in those 
processes. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Is greater public participation the proper regulatory 
response to the "four failures" of the political economy? It may 
well be argued that I have overstated my case about wider public 
participation in agency activity as an antidote to distributive 
injustice. A critic might assert that I am wrong as a matter of 
theory, practice, and reality. Instead of complaining about the 
imperfections of the democratic process, it may be propounded 
that we accept them for what they are-imperfections in an 
imperfect world. In addition, the critique continues, I should 
resign myself to the reality that some small groups simply suffer 
"relative disadvantage[s]" as a result of "accommodation[s] to 
the political process."ss Such pragmatism has an apparent 
attraction; the system works relatively well and is relatively 
54. See Charles Ellison, Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory, SYSTEMATIC 
ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE REsOLUTION (Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991). 
55. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990). 
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accessible. The reality, however, is difficult. Recent scholarship 
and government reports indicate that practice correlates with 
theory and that the dis empowered do, in fact, suffer dispropor-
tionate environmental harm. 56 
If a disenfranchised group cannot adequately participate in 
basic political and economic markets, and if constitutional and 
legal rules are titled against it, then public participation seems 
justified for at least four complimentary reasons. First, wider 
participation performs an educative function, as agency deci-
sionmakers hear both different and additional views of the sub-
ject matter of the regulation. 57 Second, for purposes of political 
accountability, government should listen to viewpoints other 
than those of the regulatee to avoid problems of capture, corrup-
tion, and the inefficient outcomes attendant with prisoner's 
dilemma games. 58 Third, wider, more inclusive participation 
serves a legitimating function, especially if, as is the normal case, 
the regulatory activity is a form of private wealth transfer. 
Finally, public participation helps satisfy the democratic ideal of 
self-government, especially in light of the four noted failures. 
While data collection and analysis will provide needed and nec-
essary information, this response should be seen as suppletive to 
a systemic change in an agency's political process. A seat at the 
table must be set and new voices must be heard during the regu-
latory dinner conversation. 
56. See sources cited supra note 8. 
57. See GLEN o. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE & 
PUBLIC LAW 129-31 (1991). 
58. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 40, at 54-98. 
